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Organizational Learning: A Process Between Equilibrium and Evolution1 
 
David Cayla 
 
Abstract: This paper aims to analyze learning as a two-type process. A dynamic equilibrium process 
represents a stable learning process, that may express an individualistic behavioral learning or 
an organizational adaptation. A teleological process represents an intentional, goal-oriented, 
learning process. This second type of learning can express an individualistic cognitive learning 
or a managerial organizational change. It is argued that this learning typology can helps to 
understand why similar organizations or individuals may learn differently when confronted to 
the same environmental stimuli. 
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Ulrich Witt (2005) recently emphasized that economic theories still have difficulties in 
understanding “why” and “how” organizations change. On the one hand Neoclassical 
approaches and New Institutional Economics based on the equilibrium notion, tend to focus 
on what organizations should do, but ignore the question of how they reach it. On the other 
hand, evolutionary economists tend to forget the intentional dimensions of change by focusing 
on fitness and adaptation. With the first perspective, change is considered as a goal without 
process; with the second, it is an infinite process that barely has a goal. 
Evidence captured by empirical analysis may change this perspective. As Marta Feldman (2000; 
2003) or Bénédicte Reynaud (2005) present it, routines are not performed by blind agents, but 
“by people who think and feel and care” (Feldman 2000, 614). Even if we accept Nelson and 
Winter’s (1982) analogy, and if we compare routines with genes, it seems necessary to integrate 
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the fact that unlike biological processes, economic mutations do not appear randomly (Metcalfe 
2005).2 Obviously, they are often the product of a conscious intention. As Witt (2005) explains, 
changes in an organization are not only conducted by a mere adaptation to external conditions, 
but also rest on strong internal considerations where hierarchical decisions have an important 
role to play. This perspective may help to analyze the cognitive and intentional dimensions of 
change in organizations. 
It is interesting to note that more than a century ago, Thorstein Veblen (1898) was aware of the 
importance of human intentions in evolution, emphasizing the “teleological” aspects of 
economic actions. For Veblen, “the change is always in the last resort a change in habits of 
thought” (1898, 391). Following this perspective, it seems necessary to restore the teleological 
aspects of human behavior in modern evolutionary analysis. In other words, to escape from a 
strict Darwinian analogy and to analyze human changes as goal-oriented processes. 
The aim of this paper is to contribute to the above mentioned perspective by characterizing two 
different types of change processes that have features of both “equilibrium” and “evolution.”. In 
doing so, we will follow Pierre Garrouste (2007), who considers that these two economic 
conceptions may be more complementary than they are substitutable. The first two sections 
study the dynamic equilibrium process and the teleological processes, respectively. The third section 
discusses the implication of this typology to the study of organizational learning, and 
concluding remarks are provided in the final section. 
 
1. Learning and the Dynamic Equilibrium Process 
Learning can be defined as a process of permanent changes in behavior that result from 
environmental interactions (Lazaric, Monnier and Paulré 1995; Garrouste 1999). Two kinds of 
learning are compatible with this definition. Behavioral learning is a learning process that does 
not modify the main features of the cognitive system. Learning to bike is an example of 
behavioral learning. Even if it implies a small cognitive dimension, it does not change the 
biker’s main intellectual conceptions (its representations system). In contrast, cognitive learning is 
a learning process that modifies the agent representations and interacts with its specific visions 
or preferences. 
                                                 
2 Metcalfe (2005) believes that intention does not have to be removed for evolutionary theory because it strengthens the evolutionary logic by 
increasing the variety and the fitness of mutations. 
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Learning appears as a typical intermediate concept that can fill the gap between the equilibrium 
and evolutionary approaches. On one hand, it needs the evolutionary approach to clarify its 
process in terms of path dependency or irrevocability (Georgescu-Roegen 1971); on the other 
hand it at least needs the equilibrium logic to understand its final perspective, its rules or its 
goal. This feature is important in terms of distinguishing a learning process from a random 
change. Learning is an organized change. For this reason it is a process that follows rules, and 
that needs pedagogy. The final results of a learning process may be infinite, but they are not 
without limit. If I am engaged in bike learning, I will not become a better econometric analyst. 
Garrouste (2007) stresses that it can be interesting to develop economic models based on both 
the equilibrium and evolutionary notions. To support his assertion, he develops the concept of 
dynamic equilibrium. For Garrouste, a dynamic equilibrium characterizes a system on which “the 
whole forces that applies on it do not make it go away from a specific course” (Garrouste 2007, 
441). In other words, it is a stable process of evolution. 
A system that is in dynamic equilibrium can tend toward a state or a set of states (if its end is 
given), or it may only follow a trajectory or a logic, if it does not have a given end. A dynamic 
equilibrium process is therefore compatible with the notion of intention. As Garrouste (2007, 
446) explains, the final characteristics of this kind of process depends on the type of rules it 
follows, which may be ex ante determined. Because the rules that direct a dynamic equilibrium 
process do not change, the evolution of the behavior of the learning system is limited inside a 
certain path. 
A dynamic equilibrium may express a move in a known environment. First, the agent decides 
her move, taking into account what she knows about the space. Once the move is determined, 
she will engage herself in the moving process. Some foreseeable perturbations (if the space is 
known) may occur that will bring her to adapt her move without changing the rules of her 
moving process. Therefore, the changes of the agent behavior are stable, and her decisions will 
stay in an ex ante determined trajectory. Her rationality is then bounded inside this trajectory. 
 
2. The Teleological Processes 
In an uncertain and changing environment, it may be necessary to consider the possibility for 
the rules to change during the evolution process. This new kind of process refers to Veblen’s 
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teleological principles, i.e. the integration of the agent’s intentions in the characteristics of the 
process. A teleological process can be defined as a dynamic equilibrium whose rules are 
determined endogenously, as a relation between the system’s behavior and its intentions. In 
contrast to the dynamic equilibrium, the rules and the trajectory of a teleological process may 
change. This change may be due to a change in the system’s intention or the system’s evaluation 
of the relation between its intention and its behavior. 
Charles Taylor (1964) defines a teleological behavior as a goal oriented behavior that is opposed 
to a mere stimulus-response behavior. Following Taylor, Norman Malcolm (1967, 98) defines 
the logic of a teleological behavior as:  
Whenever the state of S and of environment E is such that B is required for some event G, 
then B occurs. 
With B representing the system S behavior, E the environment and G the goal of S. It is 
possible to transform this expression into the following formula: 
(1) (s) {(Bs → Gs) → Bs} 
The arrows represent the logical links between two events. For example, a stimulus-response 
behavior can be simply expressed by: 
(2) (s) E → Bs. 
Expression (1) is interesting because it implies two logical links. Link I expresses the relation 
between behavior B and goal G, whereas link II represents the relation between the first link and 
the effective behavior of S. 
This expression is useful to distinguish the two necessary conditions of a teleological behavior. 
The agent must first accomplish action B (link II), and second, must have the intention to do so 
by evaluating the relation between B and G (link I). Taken separately, however, these two 
conditions are not sufficient. As Taylor says: “I may decide to stab someone, and, before I can 
execute my intention, my arm may be pushed” (1964, 33). It is therefore the whole expression 
that has to be taken into account in a teleological behavior, and not only the coincidence of both 
the intention and the behavior. 
In expression (1), Link II represents the effective behavior of S, whereas link I only describes a 
perception. As Taylor explains, with an intentional system it is not necessary that action B 
produces G effectively for the occurrence of B. “What is sufficient (in the absence of interfering 
(I) (II) 
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factors) is that the “system” believes that B is required for G, or sees B as required for G” (Taylor 
1964, 62). It is therefore impossible to reduce (1) to a relation of the kind G → B. To say it 
differently, agents can be wrong. The behavior of S may not reach her goal if her beliefs do not 
reflect the reality of E. More than twenty years earlier than Taylor (1964), this fact had been 
underlined by Albert Hofstadter (1941, 33) who explained that in a teleological behavior, 
knowing the goal is generally not sufficient to correctly foresee the behavior. For Hofstadter, a 
teleological behavior rests on two different dimensions. First, the “objective dimension” reflects 
the effective behavior of S that is given by link II, which can be observed by any element of E. 
Second, the “subjective dimension” reflects the system’s beliefs that result from its cognitive 
system (link I). Unlike the former, the subjective dimension of a teleological behavior cannot be 
observed directly from outside, but can be deduced from the objective behavior (Hofstadter 
1941, 34). 
The changing process of a teleological behavior is what we define as a teleological process. The 
main features of a teleological process are analogous to the ones of a teleological behavior. Like 
a teleological behavior, a teleological process is based on a double dimension, which represents 
a double equilibrium. The first equilibrium expresses, like in a dynamic equilibrium, the 
stability of the rules that guide a behavioral process. The second equilibrium expresses the 
stability of representations and perceptions (i.e., the cognitive system) that determines the 
behavioral process. As long as the cognitive system is unchanged, the rules that direct the 
evolution of the behavior stay in equilibrium. The process followed by the system will be similar 
to a classic dynamic equilibrium process. However, during the learning process, some changes 
may appear in the agent’s cognitive system. These changes will be expressed by a change in the 
agent’s objectives, or a change in her perception of the relation between her behavior and her 
goals (a change in B → G). In this case, the rules of the process will have to change in order to 
be aligned with the new cognitive system. 
A teleological process may express a move in an unknown environment. After the agent has 
decided a general route for her move, she will take the opportunity to revise her path during 
her progress, taking into account the information and knowledge she has gathered from her 
real environment. 
The logic of a teleological process differs from the dynamic equilibrium in three aspects. First, it 
rests on an “unbounded” rationality principle. In a teleological process, the agent not only 
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questions the means, but also the finalities of the process. Secondly, it rests on a strong 
subjective dimension. The features of the process depend not only on the environment and the 
preferences of the agent, but also the specific characteristics of her cognitive system. Two 
persons with the same objectives, in the same environment, and with the same cognitive 
limitations may act differently if their perceptions are different and if they do not interpret 
identically the B → G relation. Finally, a teleological process is more open, in its final results, 
than a dynamic equilibrium. It involves a strong uncertain dimension, partly due to the 
uncertainty of the environment, but more fundamentally, due to the uncertainty of the 
knowledge creation process. 
 
3. Types of Process and Types of Organizational Learning 
We are now able to distinguish two types of learning processes: 
1.  A dynamic equilibrium process represents a stable changing process, directed by stable 
rules. It follows a stable (and therefore mainly foreseeable) trajectory. The actions of an agent 
who follows a dynamic equilibrium are limited and her rationality can be considered as 
bounded.  
2.  A teleological process is a process in which the finality and the rules can be revised in 
relation to an end. It rests on two equilibrium levels instead of one. Unlike the dynamic 
equilibrium process, its finality is uncertain and it necessitates a more complete rationality 
model that can integrate the agent’s subjective dimension. 
At an individual level, these two types of processes may express two types of learning. As it is 
discussed in the first section, behavioral learning is a learning that does not affect the agent’s 
cognitive system. For this reason, behavioral learning may be analyzed as a teleological process 
where the cognitive dimension will stay unchanged, that is, as a dynamic equilibrium process. 
On the other hand, cognitive learning is a kind of learning that affects an agent’s 
representations. As a consequence, this kind of learning has to be analyzed as a full teleological 
process with an uncertain end and trajectory. 
At an organizational level, learning can be defined as a process of change in organizational 
behavior. Two types of organizational learning can therefore be defined. First, an organizational 
learning can be defined as an adaptive process that occurs in response to a change in the 
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environment. This type of learning appears while the main goals of the organization stay 
unchanged. It is analogous to an individual behavioral learning, or, more specifically, to a 
Darwinian evolutionary process. This type of learning can also refer to an internal coordination 
process. It therefore implies a collective and reciprocal adaptation of individual behaviors that 
end toward a Hayekian equilibrium. Second, an organizational learning can refer to a guided 
organizational change. This type of change is not due to a change in the environment but to a 
conscientious managerial decision. It rests on a specific strategy that is related to a specific goal, 
or on a more implicit collective intention. 
In our typology, organizational adaptation/coordination refers to a dynamic equilibrium 
process. It follows a stable set of rules, which means that its end can mostly be foreseen. Guided 
organizational changes, however, need to be analyzed as a teleological process. The results and 
consequences of this type of organizational learning may therefore be difficult to predict 
because the trajectory of such a process is founded on a cognitive system which has specific 
goals and intentions. However, as Hofstadter showed, it is possible to deduce the goal that the 
system aims to reach by studying the effective organizational behavior over time. 
 
4. Conclusions 
The distinction between teleological learning processes and dynamic equilibrium learning 
processes (in other words, between adaptive processes and guided processes), may help us 
understand the reason why two communities may act differently in the face of the same 
disturbance in their environment. For example, Reynaud (2005) empirically studied the way a 
team adapts its collective behavior when it is confronted by new rules that come from the 
management. Her implicit hypothesis is that the way the team will adapt to these rules will not 
depend on the way it is internally structured, but on the nature of the routines it will 
implement in order to follow the rules. The above analysis leads us to a different conclusion: If 
the team that is confronted by new managerial rules is centrally controlled by an authority (i.e., 
a leader) that aims to follow a specific intention, the reaction of the team to these new rules will 
not be the same as that of a team structured as a self-organized system. In the first case, it will 
develop a teleological changing process that is hard to foresee and that may contradict the first 
management’s anticipations; in the second case, the team will only adapt itself to the new rules 
in an inter-individual and decentralized process, in a dynamic equilibrium process. 
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In terms of a future research agenda, more empirical research is needed to examine the 
distinction between adaptive and guided change processes. Moreover, it may be particularly 
interesting to evaluate the role of collective intentions in the way organizations adapt 
themselves to a change in their environment. 
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